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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of important bankruptcy opinions appeared in 2010 as
bankruptcy courts continued to work through volumes of filings
and difficult challenges posed by recent economic events and the
structure of complex debt and equity obligations. Discussed below are
various court opinions which the authors believe are significant, either for
their legal holdings, their practical applications, or as guidance for practi-
tioners that may encounter similar issues.
As it clamped down on the effects of Chapter 11 plans (for example, its
judicial estoppel opinions), the Fifth Circuit and other courts continued to
recognize the broad scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction in class actions and
Chapter 15 cases and, in some respects, attempted to make administra-
tion of bankruptcy estates more flexible for bankruptcy courts. The U.S.
Supreme Court offered significant guidance, primarily in the realm of
consumer bankruptcies and Chapter 13 but with broader application to
the general confirmation of bankruptcy plans and their effects. It seems
to appear that the U.S. Supreme Court's opinions are at odds with some
recent Fifth Circuit opinions apparently limiting the effects of plan confir-
mation-an interesting potential juxtaposition that practitioners will be
able to use as they continue struggling with these Fifth Circuit opinions.
Bankruptcy courts issued numerous opinions, many of them too fact-spe-
cific for inclusion in this article, although certain bankruptcy court opin-
ions included in this Survey are of broader importance. Given the
volume of recent real estate filings, and the perceived likelihood of a
large number of real estate Chapter 11s in the near future, practitioners
will find some guidance from these lower court opinions. Of particular
interest is how the lower courts are analyzing the duties of a debtor-in-
possession and the effect of these decisions on a Chapter 11 plan. Such
issues are raised more often in Chapter 11 real estate cases where there
are insider guarantees and large deficiency claims. Furthermore, several
important opinions are currently on appeal and practitioners are en-





A. IN RE CONDOR INSURANCE LTD.'
Condor Insurance Ltd. is an important jurisdictional opinion regarding
Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Code"). In this
case, a liquidation proceeding was pending in the Federation of Saint
Kitts and Nevis. The bankruptcy court recognized the case as a foreign
main proceeding. The foreign representative then filed an adversary pro-
ceeding against a domestic company alleging the equivalent of a fraudu-
lent transfer claim under Nevis law. The bankruptcy court dismissed the
adversary proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit reversed.2 Applying ordinary rules of statutory inter-
pretation, the circuit noted that Chapter 15 specifically directs courts to
"consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application
of the chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes
adopted by foreign jurisdictions' in interpreting its provisions."'3 The
court noted that prior to the adoption of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
("Model Law") (codified as Chapter 15 in the United States Code), U.S.
courts were frequently more willing to assist foreign liquidation proceed-
ings than foreign courts were to U.S. proceedings. Chapter 15 was par-
tially adopted to ensure that foreign countries adopting the Model Law
would provide judicial assistance to U.S. proceedings. Thus, the Model
Law is an important "effort by the United States to harmonize interna-
tional bankruptcy proceedings for the benefit of American businesses op-
erating abroad."'4 Although not explicitly stated by the Fifth Circuit, the
import of its opinion is that it would potentially prejudice U.S. proceed-
ings to obtain assistance from foreign courts if the courts were without
jurisdiction to lend assistance to foreign proceedings-striking at the very
purpose of Chapter 15.
Chapter 15 provides that a bankruptcy court may grant "any appropri-
ate relief" to the foreign representative, "except for relief available under
sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a)." 5 While domestic avoid-
ance actions are specifically excluded from the relief that may be granted,
Chapter 15 does not exclude relief under foreign avoidance laws (how-
ever, relief under domestic avoidance statutes may be granted under
Chapter 15 provisions inapplicable in this case). Therefore, applying or-
dinary statutory construction, and in light of the purpose of Chapter 15,
the Fifth Circuit concluded as follows:
[W]here there are enumerated exceptions 'additional exceptions
are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.'
1. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir.
2010).
2. Id. at 329.
3. Id. at 321 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006)).
4. Id. at 322.
5. Id. at 322-23 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(7)).
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And the oft recited maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius carries
weight. The statute provides for 'any relief' and excepts only actions
under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a) of the Code
and includes no other language suggesting that other relief might be
excepted. While the statute denies the foreign representative the
powers of avoidance created by the U.S. Code absent a filing under
Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it does not necessarily fol-
low that Congress intended to deny the foreign representative pow-
ers of avoidance supplied by applicable foreign law. If Congress
wished to bar all avoidance actions whatever their source, it could
have stated so; it did not.
6
While the court was mindful of potential forum shopping and choice of
law issues, the facts in this case did not implicate these concerns (i.e. a
foreign representative mixing and matching various provisions of domes-
tic and foreign law, as opposed to using only the Code and its distribution
scheme in exchange for its avoidance powers, the Fifth Circuit felt these
considerations could be dealt with by the trial court). Furthermore, the
circuit stated, "The foreign representatives gain no powers not contem-
plated by the laws of Nevis through filing suit in the United States and
the distribution regime established by Nevis law is not threatened by the
potential application of conflicting avoidance rules."'7
Because Chapter 15 was enacted to facilitate international cooperation
and judicial assistance, and because the foreign representative filed the
adversary proceeding based on foreign avoidance statutes and not the
Code's avoidance powers, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy
court (through reference from the district court) had subject matter juris-
diction over the suit.8 This opinion not only confirms the broad jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court but, importantly, preserves and furthers the
purpose of Chapter 15. It would be peculiar if a foreign representative
could not access Chapter 15 or the bankruptcy court to assert a right ex-
isting under foreign law (meaning he would not exploit the Code merely
for its avoidance powers), yet U.S. trustees could seek similar assistance
from foreign courts in domestic cases under the Code's avoidance pow-
ers. The principles of cooperation and mutual assistance at the heart of
Chapter 15 would be jeopardized. By addressing not only the statute's
language, but also its fundamental purpose-which itself is statutory-the
Fifth Circuit should be commended for furthering Congress' intent, some-
thing the authors hope will continue as the court construes issues involv-
ing bankruptcy jurisdiction.
B. IN RE NE 40 PARTNERS, L.P.9
In NE 40 Partners, L.P., Judge Jeff Bohm of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas considered a Chapter 7 trustee's argu-
6. Id. at 324 (quoting Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)).
7. Id. at 327.
8. Id. at 329.
9. In re NE 40 Partners, L.P., 440 B.R. 124 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
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ment that in pleading a fraudulent transfer cause of action, the trustees
should be held to a lessened pleading standard because the trustee based
the allegations on second-hand knowledge and the trustee, by definition,
did not have personal knowledge of those allegations. The court rejected
this argument.10 Noting that Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure requires a heightened pleading standard for a fraudulent transfer
suit, and construing recent Supreme Court precedent on this issue and
determining that the Fifth Circuit strictly applies Rule 9, the court con-
cluded there is no relaxed standard for a Chapter 7 trustee." The court
instead encouraged Chapter 7 trustees to employ the tools provided to
them, including Bankruptcy Rule 2004, to investigate underlying matters
prior to filing a complaint.
Although the court's opinion is well reasoned and appears correct, it
seems unlikely that the result (perhaps necessarily so) will promote the
"just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceed-
ing" required by Bankruptcy Rule 1001.12 A fraudulent transfer defen-
dant, on the other hand, is entitled to detailed notice of allegations
against him. The potential problem is that these defendants will use the
opinion to transform an orderly motion to dismiss or a motion for more
definite statement into a gatekeeper process involving several rounds of
motion litigation causing multiple proceedings. Such opinion may re-
quire a trustee to devote estate resources for prelitigation discovery (such
as under Bankruptcy Rule 2004) where the estate may have no funds to
pay for these expenses.
III. AUTOMATIC STAY
A. IN RE TEXAS RANGERS BASEBALL PARTNERS1 3
Section IV of this article contains a detailed discussion of the Texas
Rangers opinion asit affects Chapter 11 plans. This opinion is also briefly
discussed in this Section for a secondary, but important point. The lend-
ers of the debtor argued that under the prepetition loan documents, when
the debtor went into default the lenders had a right to effectively remove
the management of the debtor and replace it with management of their
choosing. The court disagreed for several factual reasons and also be-
cause such an attempt postpetition would violate the automatic stay. The
court held that "any effort on the part of Chase to enforce its contractual
right to control either entity or Debtor would amount to a violation of the
automatic stay of Code § 362(a)."'1 4 The authors of this article believe
that postpetition attempts to remove management based on prepetition
contract rights are infrequent. Nevertheless, given recent loan agree-
ments and covenants under which borrowers seemingly grant everything
10. Id. at 129.
11. Id. at 127-29.
12. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001.
13. In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
14. Id. at 404.
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to a lender upon default, this issue may be litigated again. In such an
instance, the Texas Rangers opinion together with other reported prece-
dent, provides support for the proposition that an automatic stay prohib-
its such postpetition change of control. Moreover, if a court grants relief
from the stay and permits a lender to change the debtor's management, it
appears that a court would more likely appoint a trustee because the in-
dependence and impartiality of a creditor-appointed management may
well be questioned.
IV. CHAPTER 11 PLANS
A. IN RE OCEANAIRE TEXAS RESTAURANT Co., L.P.
15
Oceanaire Texas Restaurant Co., L.P. is not a published opinion, but is
included due to its unique set of facts and the important principle it
teaches. In this case, Chief Judge Barbara Houser of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas denied confirmation of a 100%
payment plan because the court found the debtor had not proposed the
plan in good faith. 16 Specifically, the debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition
to reject unprofitable leases and to restructure obligations to the bank for
its upscale restaurants. The debtor proposed a plan with a 100% payout
to unsecured creditors over a five year period:
The [creditors] committee objected to confirmation of the plan for
a variety of reasons, including ... that, one, the plan was not pro-
posed in good faith; two, the plan was not feasible; three because
unsecured creditors were not receiving deferred cash payments hav-
ing a present value equal to their allowed claims, the plan was not
fair and equitable; and four, because a former equity holder of the
parent debtor ... was receiving property under the plan, the plan
failed to satisfy the absolute priority rule .... 17
The crux of the committee's objection was that while the plan nomi-
nally promised payment in full, such payment was risky and was made
over time. Similarly, several interested bidders had approached the com-
mittee and indicated they were prepared to purchase the debtor's assets
for an amount sufficient to pay all creditors in full immediately. One
such bidder, Landry's Restaurants, Inc. ("Landry's"), offered enough
cash to fully pay all priority, secured, and unsecured creditors, together
with assumption of all leases and executory contracts, thereby saving all
the restaurants and the jobs of employees. The debtor represented it
would negotiate with Landry's in good faith, and if Landry's offer was
more favorable than that of the former equity holder of its parent debtor,
the debtor would then substitute Landry's offer into the plan. Landry's
15. Transcript of Telephonic Proceedings Before the Honorable Barbara Hauser, U.S.
Chief Bankr. Judge, In re Oceanaire Tex. Rest. Co., L.P., No. 09-34262-bjh-11 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Jan. 29, 2010).
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 14.
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submitted what the court deemed as a "clearly superior offer.' u 8 How-
ever, the debtor filed its plan with the offer of another bidder, Clarion
Capital Partners, LLC ("Clarion"). The court denied confirmation, not-
ing "the irony of the Court's conclusion that a plan that proposes a 100%
distribution to unsecured creditors is not proposed in good faith" and
acknowledging the court presided over many cases where plans proposing
far less were confirmed.1 9 While the debtor's plan was ostensibly a 100%
payment plan, the court determined it was in fact a "thinly-veiled attempt
to shield Clarion, an insider equity holder, from the economic reality of
today's marketplace. '20
Although the facts in Oceanaire are not frequently encountered-how
often are there competing 100% plans and how often is a 100% plan pro-
posed in bad faith?-this opinion stands for the proposition that a plan's
merits and good faith are not viewed in a vacuum, but rather, a court may
review and analyze readily available alternatives to the debtor to assess
whether the debtor really proposed the plan in good faith. The case is
also an important reminder that the management and professionals of a
debtor-in-possession must act in the best interests of the estate, and that
an immediate, guaranteed, full payment, along with preservation of the
business and employees, is clearly better than a speculative, five year plan
that primarily benefits equity. Yet the opinion is troubling because 11
U.S.C. § 1129 provides that a court "shall" confirm a plan if all the plan
requirements are met; resorting to good faith and a comparison of alter-
natives for an otherwise accepted plan suggests a debtor's business judg-
ment is susceptible, not only to questioning, but also to being
superseded. 2 1 It is also interesting to compare this opinion to the Texas
Rangers opinion discussed below where the issue was also a 100% plan.
B. IN RE TEXAS RANGERS BASEBALL PARTNERS
2 2
Most practitioners are familiar with the Texas Rangers case, including
the colorful nature of some participants, the critical timing issues, and the
auction that ultimately led to a successful result. Along the way, how-
ever, Judge D. Michael Lynn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of Texas faced difficult questions of law regarding
confirmation of the debtor's plan. Judge Lynn's discussion of the various
confirmation requirements and equity's role in a confirmation setting are
instructive because although the facts of Texas Rangers are rare, the legal
principles governing the case are routinely faced by practitioners. Fortu-
nately, through the efforts of various professionals and two bankruptcy
judges, the Code was shown to be flexible enough to handle a case this
complex and demanding.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 24.
20. Id. at 19.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
22. In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
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In this case, the debtor guaranteed a portion of its ultimate parent's
overall indebtedness. Prior to the petition date, the debtor secured a sale
of its business to a buyer approved by Major League Baseball. That sale
would pay all the debtor's creditors in full and lead to a distribution to
equity. While the debtor would pay its obligation to the lenders, the
lenders argued there were other parties who would pay substantially
more for the debtors' assets. This would lead to a greater distribution to
equity, ultimately benefiting the lenders, the lenders could not benefit
from an increase in value of the debtor's assets under the guaranty be-
cause the debtor's guarantee obligation was capped, but they could bene-
fit by attaching and seizing the distributions to the equity holders, who
were also obligors. The debtor filed its plan on the same date it filed its
petition, which proposed to consummate the purchase to the approved
buyer. The plan would have paid the guarantee obligation in full and all
other unsecured claims. Thus, the debtor argued the lenders were
unimpaired and not entitled to vote on the plan. The lenders argued,
among other things, that they were impaired because, the plan did not
leave their legal rights unaltered as required by § 1124 of the Code, al-
though the plan might pay their claim in full. The loan documents gave
the lenders the right to approve or reject, among other things, any pro-
posed sale of the team. Because the plan operated in a way that took this
right from the lenders, the lenders argued they were impaired and there-
fore entitled to vote on the plan.
The court also considered whether the debtor had a duty to maximize
the value of its estate even though the current plan provided for 100%
payment of all claims and a substantial return to equity-i.e. did the
debtor have a duty to maximize a return to equity? Complicating the
issue was the equity holders' consent to the plan (indeed, they effectively
proposed the sale component to the plan), meaning that creditors were to
be paid in full and the only parties potentially prejudiced by a failure to
obtain the highest price for the team had consented to this failure.
The court first addressed the duty to maximize value. Reviewing cases
generally applying this point, the court noted:
In none of these cases did the court directly face the value max-
imization issue where the facts were that (1) the debtor was clearly
solvent and paying creditors in full and (2) all the equity owners had
consented to accept a transaction that provided to them less than
their potential maximum recovery. 23
The court also particularly noted that a fundamental purpose of the
Code and Chapter 11 is to provide a mechanism for consensual restruc-
turing of rights and obligations: "It is an underlying premise of the Code
that parties should be allowed to structure their own resolutions in cases
respecting how claims and interests will be satisfied from a debtor's es-
23. Id. at 400-01.
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tate."'24 After all, taken in isolation, the equity holders were free to ac-
cept less than optimum treatment:
Allowing a class to elect less than optimal treatment is sensible. A
class-particularly one of equity interests-may have motives other
than maximizing return. For example, a class of trade creditors or
equity owners may elect to give up value to maintain business rela-
tionships or continue particular management in control of a debtor.
25
Accordingly, under the facts of this case, where all creditors would be
paid in full and equity holders had accepted the plan, the court concluded
that the debtor did not have a duty to maximize value for its equity hold-
ers.26 The court cautioned, however, that the equity holders are not nec-
essarily free to accept a plan that does not maximize value for their
creditors. 27
With respect to the impairment issue, the court decided that the lend-
ers were in fact impaired under the plan notwithstanding the full pay-
ment.28 Describing unimpairment generally, the court noted that not
being impaired is as "if a creditor receives under a plan everything to
which the creditor would be entitled in a judgment entered immediately
following the plan's effective date."'29 Here, the lenders had contract
rights in addition to mere payment of a capped guarantee obligation.
However, the court disagreed with the lenders that one of those rights
included the right to approve or disapprove any proposed sale of the
team. As held by the court, § 1124(1) is prospective because "section
1124(1) does not require that a plan provide for the cure of defaults-i.e.,
recreation of the situation as it was before default. Rather it requires that,
as of the plan's effective date, an unimpaired creditor be able thereafter
to exercise all its rights vis-d-vis its debtor."'30 Because a sale of the team
would be effectuated prior to the effectiveness of the plan, the lenders
could still be unimpaired as of such plan effectiveness and thereafter,
even though rights were modified or suspended prior to plan effective-
ness. As with any case involving contractual breach, the lenders would
have a potential claim against the debtor or third parties, but this would
not leave them impaired.
Additionally, the court noted that giving the lenders the right to ap-
prove or disapprove a sale of the team while a debtor is under the court's
jurisdiction, is inconsistent with the Code and contrary to public policy:
24. Id. at 401.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 402.
27. Of interest, the lenders filed involuntary petitions against the equity holders.
Thus, those equity holders would be voting on the debtor's plan as alleged debtors. Given
these facts, the court invoked § 303(f) of the Code and required the equity holders/alleged
debtors act in a fiduciary capacity to their creditors similar to a trustee. Id. at 405.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. at 407 (citing Bustep Shelters of Lewisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 914 F.2d
810, 814-15 (6th Cir. 1990)).
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As a sale of the Rangers, whether under Code § 363 or under a
plan, by Debtor acting as a debtor-in-possession is a transaction un-
dertaken by Debtor in its role as a fiduciary, it would be inconsistent
with the authority and responsibility conferred on that fiduciary by
law to give effect to a contractual provision that would frustrate its
performance of its fiduciary duties.31
Similarly, in the event the lenders exercised their contractual sale ap-
proval rights, the only way the debtors could potentially confirm a plan
would be to "artificially" impair a class for voting purposes, which is also
inconsistent with public policy when that class was otherwise left
unimpaired. Thus, the court held that the lenders were not impaired be-
cause they were not permitted to exercise their sale approval rights dur-
ing the pendency of the case, and impairment under § 1124(1) of the
Code operates prospectively after effectiveness of the plan.32 However,
because the plan did not provide for the lender's full, prospective rights
under the loan documents after plan effectiveness, the plan did in fact
impair the lenders.
In summary, these are the important principles from the Texas Rangers
case: (1) a debtor may not have a duty to maximize value of an estate if
creditors are paid in full or equity, holders (and perhaps creditors) accept
lesser treatment and (2) a creditor can be unimpaired even if its rights are
modified during a case, so long as the creditor retains its legal rights after
the effective date. While these important principles have broader appli-
cation than just the Texas Rangers case, interesting questions remain. For
example, creditors and equity holders voting on a plan may not know
about a potential alternative that offers a higher return. They may still
accept that plan, but may act differently if they knew of a better alterna-
tive. In this respect, Texas Rangers and Oceanaire seem at odds. On the
other hand, so long as full disclosure is provided and the creditors or eq-
uity holders accept lesser treatment, why should they not be free to do
so? With respect to impairment, what does it mean to have your rights
preserved prospectively after a plan if during the case your rights were
effectively and permanently lost? Is that not the height of form over sub-
stance? Judge Lynn notes, however, that a creditor in that position has a
resulting claim against the debtor or third parties that may provide a suf-
ficient safeguard.33 Indeed, how can any creditor under today's loan doc-
ument be unimpaired when filing a petition itself is often a breach,
various loan ratios and bankruptcy litigation are further breaches, and
historical non-monetary breaches cannot be cured? So it appears the
question of impairment must be suspended during the pendency of a case
for it to have meaning. Perhaps that is the ultimate lesson of Texas Rang-
ers-the Code has sufficient flexibility to accommodate unusual debtors
and cases and parties have sufficient rights and remedies to facilitate re-
31. Id. at 410.
32. Id. at 409-10.
33. See id. at 408.
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organization, to effectuate the purposes of the Code, and to pay creditors,
which are essentially what the process is all about.
C. IN RE TEXAS WYOMING DRILLING, INC.
3 4
Chapter 11 practitioners are well aware of United Operating, in which
the Fifth Circuit held that a postconfirmation entity lacks standing to
prosecute causes of action not specifically and unequivocally preserved in
a Chapter 11 plan. 35 In Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc., Judge D. Michael
Lynn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas
considered this issue in a consolidated opinion regarding two separate
cases and plans. The court held a categorical reservation of avoidance
actions (without naming each defendant and describing each cause of ac-
tion) is sufficient and satisfies United Operating's requirements. 36 The
court separately held in the opinion's second case that even though the
confirmed plan failed to sufficiently retain the causes of action, the plan
must be read with the disclosure statement, and read together, the debtor
had adequately retained the causes of action.37 Each opinion is ad-
dressed below.
1. Categorical Preservation of Avoidance Actions
At issue was a confirmed Chapter 11 plan; the court converted the case
to Chapter 7 after confirmation and the effectiveness of that plan, in light
of the debtor's defaults is addressed. After confirmation, but prior to
conversion, the debtor initiated fraudulent transfer avoidance actions
against multiple prepetition equity interest holders, alleging that the de-
fendants received fraudulent transfers. After conversion, the trustee con-
tinued prosecuting the claims, and the defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the trustee lacked standing because the plan did
not preserve the causes of action to the level of specificity required by
United Operating. The plan did not name the defendants; rather, it con-
tained a categorical reservation of claims provision that retained any and
all avoidance actions (which the plan defined as including claims under
§ 548 of the Code), and vested the same in the postconfirmation reorga-
nized debtor. The defendants argued that this language was not "specific
and unequivocal" as required by United Operating, which the court found
otherwise controlling.
The court noted that while United Operating sets forth the "specific and
unequivocal" standard, the issue presented was "[wihat does it mean for
language to be specific and unequivocal? '38 Although United Operating
holds that a "blanket reservation of 'any and all claims' is insufficient,"
34. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, LLC (In re Tex. Wyoming Drilling, Inc.),
422 B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
35. United Operating, L.L.C. v. Dynasty Oil & Gas, L.L.C., 540 F.3d 351,355 (5th Cir.
2008).
36. Tex. Wyoming, 422 B.R. at 629.
37. Id. at 630-31.
38. Id. at 625.
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this did not end the inquiry.39 First, while United Operating recognized
the "specific and unequivocal" standard, the Fifth Circuit did not require
identification of a specific cause of action against a specific defendant.
On the contrary, the Fifth Circuit cited its approval of non-binding case
law where a categorical reservation of preference claims was found to be
sufficient. "The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thus has not required a
plan to identify specific individuals or entities as prospective defendants
in order to preserve the claims; rather, as appropriate, claims may be pre-
served by category."'40 Here, the issue was avoidance actions-causes of
action created by Congress benefitting creditors by enabling the debtor
or trustee to avoid and recover prepetition transfers made at their ex-
pense. The court therefore doubted that the Fifth Circuit intended a
broad application of United Operating that would prejudice the creditors
by leading to a loss of valuable rights through an inadvertent "application
of a '17th Century' test for pleadings."'41
Second, given that the primary concern in United Operating was that
creditors voting on a plan be given sufficient notice of intent to sue those
creditors postconfirmation, the court analyzed whether such notice was
provided to the defendants:
The purpose of the specific and unequivocal language requirement
is not to put potential defendants (at least those not voting on the
plan) on notice of lawsuits that may be brought against them; rather,
the purpose is to put creditors that are entitled to vote on notice that
there may be assets in the form of potential lawsuits so that they may
pass on the plan with sufficient knowledge of the assets that are
available to pay the claims held by the creditors against the debtor.
Consequently, the question of whether standing to pursue the TWD
Claims post-confirmation has been preserved turns on whether the
language in the TWD Plan was sufficient to put creditors on notice
that TWD anticipated pursuing the TWD Claims after
confirmation.42
Not only did the plan contain a categorical reservation of claims, but
also the plan defined avoidance actions as including fraudulent transfer
claims. The plan further set forth a mechanism where the reorganized
debtor would transmit to defendants a letter agreement tolling limitations
in order to provide additional time for potential negotiations and consen-
sual resolution. Furthermore, the disclosure statement identified several
defendants by name and categorically identified unnamed defendants.
The disclosure statement also provided an estimate of potential fraudu-
lent transfer claims and discussed potential barriers to recovery. Thus,
creditors were sufficiently placed on notice that the reorganized debtor
reserved the right to assert avoidance actions postconfirmation and the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 626-27.
41. Id. at 627 n.15.
42. Id. at 627-28 (internal citations omitted).
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debtor would prosecute those actions with proceeds used towards funding
the plan.
Therefore, because notice to creditors voting on a plan underpinned
the Fifth Circuit's analysis in United Operating, and because the debtor
clearly informed the creditors that it was preserving avoidance actions
and vesting them in the reorganized debtor, the "specific and unequivo-
cal" standard was met through the categorical reservation of claims. The
court noted that the result might well be different if the causes of action
in question were not avoidance actions.4 3 But, because (1) nothing in
United Operating required identification of a defendant by name and
identifying the cause of action against that defendant, (2) United Operat-
ing confirmed that a categorical reservation of claims sufficed for avoid-
ance actions but not other actions, and (3) creditors received sufficient
notice, the court rejected the defendants' standing and jurisdictional ar-
gument (along with the defendants' judicial estoppel and res judicata
arguments).44
This is an important opinion for several reasons. As Chapter 11 practi-
tioners know, it has been difficult to properly interpret United Operat-
ing's holding. It is unrealistic and unworkable to expect a debtor to
investigate each and every cause of action while doing all the things re-
quired of a Chapter 11 debtor prior to formulating a plan, putting the
entire case on hold and devoting substantial resources so that the debtor
can provide the court with exhaustive detail on each potentially valuable
cause of action. Conversely, merely naming each potential defendant and
listing each hypothetical cause of action provides no more specificity than
stating all claims against all potential defendants are preserved. The
Texas Wyoming court did not attempt to set the outer boundaries of
United Operating or set a formulistic approach to testing a retention of a
claims provision, but rather it set forth a simple and workable rule: re-
gardless of what United Operating requires for a non-bankruptcy claim,
avoidance actions, which exist to benefit the very creditors who vote on a
plan, may be retained categorically.4 5 This holding not only honors the
requirement and logic of United Operating, but it is a practical, efficient,
and reasonable approach in light of the realities of Chapter 11
administration.
The Fifth Circuit granted a direct appeal of the court's opinion with
oral arguments scheduled for April 2011. The result of that appeal will
not only be the resolution of this important question, but will also un-
doubtedly provide further guidance on the proper application of the
"specific and unequivocal" standard, which will benefit all practitioners.
Practitioners are therefore encouraged to research the results of this di-
rect appeal, and a summary thereof will almost certainly appear in next
year's Survey.
43. See id. at 629 n.17.
44. Id. at 631-35, 637.
45. See id. at 627.
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2. Importance of Disclosure Statement
The Texas Wyoming Drilling opinion considered not only the categori-
cal retention of avoidance actions under a plan, but also a separate Chap-
ter 11 plan where the debtor asserted non-bankruptcy causes of action
postconfirmation. Here, the individual Chapter 11 debtor sued her for-
mer attorneys postconfirmation under a variety of malpractice, breach of
contract, and breach of duty of care causes of action under Texas law.
The confirmed plan contained a categorical reservation of claims provi-
sion stating that "all real and personal property of the estate.., including
but not limited to all causes of action ... and any avoidance actions...
shall vest in [Ranzino-Renda]." 46 This was not so much a retention of
claims provision as a revesting provision. Ultimately, the court concluded
this was exactly the kind of blanket provision rejected by United Operat-
ing, and the plan standing alone was insufficient to preserve the underly-
ing causes of action.47
However, this was not the end of the inquiry because the disclosure
statement contained a detailed description of the causes of action against
the attorneys:
Claims Against Sullivan, Parker & Cook, L.L.C., Jeffrey Cook,
and J. Todd Key (together the "SPC Defendants"). The Debtor's
claims and causes of action against the SPC Defendants arise out of
the SPC Defendants acts and omissions as Debtor's attorney.., and
include but are not limited to claims of DTPA, negligence, breach of
contract, misrepresentation and fraud. The Debtor seeks claims for
both actual and consequential damages, reasonable and necessary at-
torney's fees, exemplary damages, and prejudgment and postjudg-
ment interest .... Under the Plan, the Debtor retains the right to
prosecute any of the foregoing claims until such time as the Debtor
determines in her reasonable business judgment that such claims are
burdensome to the Reorganized Debtor or are of inconsequential
value and benefit to the Reorganized Debtor.48
This was such a detailed description that had it been in the plan, there
would be no question this language satisfied United Operating. The ques-
tion before the court was whether the presence of this language in the
disclosure statement saved the plan from its failure to comply with United
Operating.
The court noted that "[ciontract rules of interpretation apply to bank-
ruptcy plans."'49 A contract should be construed as to effectuate the in-
tent of the parties. Furthermore, to the extent they pertain to the same
transaction, contemporaneous documents may be construed together in
assessing those parties' intent. "Thus, in a bankruptcy case, a plan and
disclosure statement may be considered together to determine the intent
46. Id. at 620.
47. Id. at 621.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 629.
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of the parties." 50 The court noted that under Bankruptcy Rule 3017,
creditors may not even receive the plan, instead just receiving the disclo-
sure statement and plan summary. Finally, the court cited various other
opinions where courts had construed a plan and a disclosure statement
together. Thus, because: (1) the disclosure statement sufficiently de-
scribed and explained the vesting of assets provision, (2) the two docu-
ments may be construed together, and (3) the disclosure statement
evidences the parties' intent, the court concluded that the disclosure
statement supplemented or explained the plan and satisfied United Oper-
ating's "specific and unequivocal" standard.51
While this holding is of significance for its conclusion and for the pro-
position that a disclosure statement and plan may be read and applied
together, it remains to be seen whether this view will be accepted. For
one thing, it is the plan, not the disclosure statement, that is the operative
document. While the court correctly analyzed contractual interpretation
rules, it may be argued under those same rules, that a disclosure state-
ment is an extraneous document that the parol evidence rule excludes
from consideration. Furthermore, United Operating specifically ad-
dresses the sufficiency of a plan's language to retain claims language. A
strict read of United Operating could appear to compel a different result.
At the same time, because United Operating is rooted in the notice re-
quirement and the disclosure statement in this case clearly and unequivo-
cally evidenced the debtor's intention to prosecute the claims
postconfirmation, reference to the disclosure statement (or for that mat-
ter other pleadings and testimony) not only makes sense, but also com-
ports with the spirit and purpose of the principles underlying the United
Operating opinion.
D. IN RE GOOD52
Good is discussed below in greater detail as it applies to judicial estop-
pel. However, it also contains an important holding for purposes of
Chapter 11: a secured claim is valued as of the confirmation date of a plan
and not as of the plan's effective date, which may be much later. Here,
the debtor's business suffered and its assets lost value after confirmation.
The debtor therefore objected to a secured claim, arguing the § 506(a)
secured portion was only about half the amount of the claim, even though
the debtor represented at confirmation that it was oversecured. The
creditor urged the court to value the claim as of the effective date of the
plan, but the court declined to do so. The court noted the absence of any
precedent supporting the debtor's position and the difficulty, if not im-
possibility, of assessing feasibility based on a date that may not occur un-
til much later in time. Conversely, while a debtor faces the potentially
50. Id.
51. Id. at 630-31.
52. In re Good, 428 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010).
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impossible task of proving feasibility, valuing a claim as of the effective
date may provide a windfall to a debtor:
Allowing a debtor to wait several months after confirmation to de-
fine the contractual effective date of the plan, and then set that date
so that its secured creditors would bear the brunt of any post-confir-
mation depreciation, would violate 'the equitable nature of bank-
ruptcy in seeking a balance between debtors and creditors. ... ,"53
This is particularly true because the debtor could manipulate the process
by removing a deficiency claim and thus force a potential no vote in the
unsecured class, while later asserting a claim objection that would lead to
a potentially large unsecured claim.
V. CHAPTER 13
A. HAMILTON V. LANNING
5 4
In this Chapter 13 case, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the require-
ment that a Chapter 13 debtor devote "projected disposable income" to
his plan.55 Specifically, the Court addressed whether the "mechanical ap-
proach" applies (which looks at monthly income multiplied by the num-
ber of plan months and then determines the disposable portion) or
whether the "forward-looking approach" applies (which looks at reasona-
bly foreseeable changes in the debtor's income or expenses). 56 The Court
held the forward-looking approach applies, meaning a court may take an-
ticipated future changes into account.57 Specifically, in this case the
debtor received a one-time buyout from her employer that greatly in-
flated her average prepetition income. The Chapter 13 trustee argued
that this amount must be used to calculate disposable income, even
though the debtor's real, postpetition income was substantially less. The
Court disagreed with the trustee's proposed inflexible approach and held
that, at least in exceptional cases or cases where future changes to income
or expenses were known or virtually certain, the bankruptcy court may
look past the strict six month look-back period provided by the Code.
The Court noted the ordinary meaning of the word "projected" does
not mean mathematical application of prior actual results, but contem-
plates future anticipated changes. The Court looked at the application of
similar statutes and also at specific Code provisions and other statutes
where Congress required a straight mathematical approach. The Court
confirmed the oft-quoted maxim that when Congress amends the bank-
ruptcy laws, it does not write on a clean state: "Pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy
practice is telling because we will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode
past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended
53. Id. at 247 (quoting Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans, L.P., 116 F.3d
790, 798 (5th Cir. 1997)).
54. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).





such a departure. '58 The Court also noted the potential for prejudice to
creditors and a windfall to debtors in the event that the debtor's postcon-
firmation income is projected to materially increase.
What is perhaps most interesting is the Court's analysis of harm to a
debtor under the mechanical approach where the debtor in a case like
this could not confirm a plan. Although the Court avoids platitudes con-
cerning a debtor's ability to rehabilitate and the equitable nature of bank-
ruptcy, the Court addresses and rejects various alternatives proposed by
the trustee. First, the Court found that delaying a filing to allow the six
month look-back period to move past an anomalous income is not often a
viable option for a debtor and delay itself may be a factor in assessing a
potential argument that the case was filed in bad faith. Next, the Court
rejected the notion that the bankruptcy court can use § 101(10A)(A)(ii)
of the Code to select a more representative six-month period because if
the Code required use of the mechanical approach, this strategy would
undermine that requirement. Third, the Court rejected the specious ar-
gument that the debtor could file a case, dismiss it, and simply refile it
when the six-month period has passed. Fourth, the Court rejected the
suggestion that a debtor could file a Chapter 7 case because the debtor, in
such an event, would lose the benefits of Chapter 13 and would be subject
to dismissal based on a presumption of abuse.
Thus, the Court effectively-in many instances without saying it-con-
firmed many bedrock principles of bankruptcy: (1) when bankruptcy laws
are amended, courts may look to prior practice unless Congress indicates
otherwise; (2) a debtor should have readily available access to the protec-
tions of bankruptcy; (3) the debtor should have the ability to reasonably
select the chapter under which he files; (4) the debtor should not file
bankruptcy merely to take advantage of the automatic stay; and (5) inter-
preting the Code should be done in a manner such that a term in one
provision of the Code has the same meaning as in another, so that no
provision of the Code should be interpreted as to render another provi-
sion meaningless because the Code is one integrated statutory scheme.
Most importantly, given its significance and the fact a conservative court
issued the opinion, the Court looked past the literal dictate of the statute
to avoid an inequitable result and to give effect to the obvious intentions
of Congress.
While this opinion lacks Chapter 11 application other than the general
principles it applies, it will affect individual debtor Chapter 11 plans and
situations where an integrated, holistic reading of the Code (giving pur-
pose and meaning to the policy and principles behind it) is required to
avoid an absurd result or a result that would clash with access to bank-
ruptcy protection and the reasonable ability to attempt reorganization.
58. Id. at 2473 (internal quotation omitted).
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B. IN RE JACOBSEN 59
Jacobsen deals with a Chapter 13 debtor's ability to dismiss the case
and the bankruptcy court's ability to convert it to Chapter 7 in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 opinion in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mas-
sachusetts. In that opinion, the Court held that a Chapter 7 debtor does
not have an absolute right to convert a case to Chapter 13, despite statu-
tory language seemingly providing for the same. 60 In Jacobsen, the Fifth
Circuit similarly concluded that a Chapter 13 debtor does not have an
absolute right to dismiss his case.6 1
Here, the Chapter 13 debtor failed to schedule valuable property and
misscheduled various other property and debt. Among other things, the
debtor purchased real property in his spouse's name on the eve of bank-
ruptcy and deeded other property to her, while still living with her, and
failed to disclose multiple other properties titled in his wife's name that
he managed. The schedules of assets and liabilities and statements of fi-
nancial affairs further contained multiple other serious omissions. After
the Chapter 13 trustee moved to convert the case, the debtor filed a mo-
tion to dismiss. The bankruptcy court ordered the case converted after an
evidentiary hearing and denied the debtor's motion to dismiss. The issue
before the Fifth Circuit was whether the debtor had an absolute right to
dismiss his case or whether the bankruptcy court could convert the case in
light of the debtor's bad faith. The court noted that lower courts within
the Fifth Circuit were split on the issue.
Reviewing extensive precedent, and relying on the Court's opinion in
Marrama, the court concluded that the debtor did not have an absolute
right to dismiss: "Following the Supreme Court's decision in Marrama, we
hold that a bankruptcy court has the discretion to grant a pending motion
to convert for cause under § 1307(c) where the debtor has acted in bad
faith or abused the bankruptcy process and requested dismissal under
§ 1307(b) in response to the motion to convert. '62 The Fifth Circuit ap-
parently adopted the bankruptcy court's logic-logic with broader impli-
cations than just this case: "[B]ankruptcy courts have broad authority to
take any action that is necessary or appropriate to prevent an abuse of
process under § 105(a) of the Code, and that they would have such power
even in the absence of § 105(a) due to the inherent power of every fed-
eral court to sanction abusive litigation practices. '63 The Fifth Circuit,
however, was cautious to explain that its opinion should not be read as
providing authority that a debtor can be forced to stay in Chapter 13
against his will. The court's issue was forced conversion to Chapter 7, not
forced continuation of a Chapter 13 case.
59. Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010).
60. See generally Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007).
61. Jacobsen, 609 F.3d at 649.
62. Id. at 660.
63. Id. at 661 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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With respect to the type of conduct that warrants denying a Chapter 13
debtor's motion to dismiss, the court did not set forth a bright line rule.
Rather, it borrowed from the Supreme Court's opinion finding the under-
lying conduct should be "atypical" and that bad faith occurs only in "ex-
traordinary cases."' 64 A debtor attempting to conceal estate property and
misleading his creditors with erroneous schedules "is clearly among the
class of atypical debtors subject to the limited exception to § 1307(b). '65
Thus, the bankruptcy court had discretion to deny the debtor's motion to
dismiss and the exercise of that discretion was supported by the eviden-
tiary record.
This case leads to an important lesson for those advising Chapter 13
debtors-if you conceal assets, mislead creditors, engage in bad faith (and
a whole host of other actions or omissions that would rise to the level of
bad faith and abuse of process), your case may be converted to Chapter 7
and you will have a trustee to deal with, not to mention a potential denial
of a Chapter 7 discharge.
VI. DISCHARGE
A. UNITED STUDENT AID FUNDS, INC. V. ESPINOSA 6 6
In this unanimous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to set aside
an order confirming a Chapter 13 plan discharging a student loan debt
without compliance with the required adversary proceeding and without
making a finding of "undue hardship. '67 Here, the creditor received no-
tice of the plan yet failed to object to confirmation of the plan and failed
to timely appeal the order confirming the plan. The Court reaffirmed
many bedrock principles governing the confirmation of a plan and the
effects of that confirmation in the process-principles that apply to Chap-
ter 13 plans as well as plans under the Code's other chapters.
The Court addressed whether the order was "void" under Rule
60(b)(4) because of failure to comply with the rules and failure to find
"undue hardship." The Court found that the order confirming a plan is a
final judgment. Noting the strong interest of finality under a confirmed
plan for the benefit of the debtor and all the creditors, the Court noted
that whether a judgment is void is narrowly reviewed, and only for certain
limited reasons-the most common being fundamental due process or
lack of jurisdiction. "A judgment is not void . . . 'simply because it is or
may have been erroneous." 68 Similarly, a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is "not a
substitute for a timely appeal."'69 Here, the requirement for finding "un-
due hardship" and the requirement to file an adversary proceeding were
not jurisdictional. Moreover, the failure to serve the creditor with a sum-
64. Id. at 662 (quoting Marrama, 549 U.S. 365 at n.11).
65. Id. at 663.
66. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).
67. Id. at 1372.




mons and complaint may have deprived the creditor of a procedural rule,
but it did not deprive the creditors of fundamental due process because
the creditor was served with the plan: "United received actual notice of
the filing and contents of Espinosa's plan. This more than satisfied
United's due process rights."'70 The Court additionally confirmed that the
creditor submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by
filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case. Having submitted to the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and having actual notice of the plan,
"Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a license for litigants to sleep on their
rights."71
This is not an important opinion that sets forth a new rule of law, inter-
prets a new statute, or answers a previously ambiguous issue. Rather, it is
important because it confirms the principles discussed above, including:
(1) the finality of bankruptcy plans despite clear legal error, (2) the need
to object in bankruptcy to preserve rights, (3) the importance of actual
notice in bankruptcy as opposed to formalistic notice, (4) the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction, and (5) the submission of one's self to that jurisdic-
tion. These are principles that bankruptcy practitioners know well and
have relied on for many years. Yet it seems the Fifth Circuit has in some
respects curtailed some of these principles in, for example, its recent
opinions on equitable mootness (which is admittedly a different issue)
and claim retention under a plan. This is why the Court's opinion in Espi-
nosa is important-to remind various lower courts that the fundamental
principles governing confirmed plans remain alive and well.
At the same time, the Court cautioned that bankruptcy courts should
deny confirmation of a plan that obviously violates the Code even if the
creditor fails to object to the plan. As stated by the Court, "the Code
makes plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority-indeed, the obli-
gation-to direct a debtor to conform his plan to the requirements of
§§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(8). a7 2 Thus, "the bankruptcy court must make
an independent determination of undue hardship before a plan is con-
firmed, even if the creditor fails to object or appear in the adversary pro-
ceeding. '73 This is also the lesson of Espinosa: bankruptcy courts have an
independent duty to deny confirmation of a plan where it obviously vio-
lates the Code. This is a duty that various bankruptcy courts have ad-
dressed differently with differing degrees of scrutiny. After Espinosa,
one may find bankruptcy courts applying greater scrutiny to plans. With
courts being as busy as they are, however, if a creditor does not raise the
issue, it is difficult to imagine that bankruptcy courts will scour every plan
proposed or confirmed for legal error.
Another issue is whether a debtor's lawyer should ensure compliance
with the Code-at least as to the more pertinent provisions of the
70. Id. at 1378.
71. Id. at 1380.




Code-not only pursuant to his duties to the court and the estate, but
also to the bankruptcy system as a whole, at least until the Supreme
Court or Congress changes the present practice; all due to a perceived
intentional manipulation of the plan process by debtor's counsel as fore-
showed in Espinosa's comment that Congress is free to correct any per-
ceived abuse of the plan system.
B. IN RE MOSEMAN 7 4
Moseman is a Chapter 7 case involving a § 727 discharge objection.
Chief Judge Brenda Rhoades of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the East-
ern District of Texas rejected a creditor's discharge objection and granted
the debtor a discharge. Most of the court's opinion is fact-based. How-
ever, one portion of the opinion merits attention for its potentially
broader application and for an apparent change from prior practice.
Namely, whether prepetition placement of a non-exempt asset into an
exempt asset on the eve of bankruptcy is grounds for a denial of dis-
charge under § 27(a) of the Code.
Here, the debtor owned two houses prepetition. The debtor and his
wife lived in one house for more than ten years, designating it as their
homestead. The debtor had no equity in this house. With respect to the
debtor's second house, the debtor used it as a rental house or as a home
for his parents. The debtor had substantial equity in the second house.
On the eve of bankruptcy, the debtor and his wife moved into the second
house and claimed the house as exempt. The creditor sought to block the
debtor's discharge because the taking of what was otherwise non-exempt
property and placing it outside the creditors reach was the transfer of the
debtor's property with the intent to hinder and delay creditors. The court
ruled against the creditor finding no wrongful intent and otherwise re-
jecting the creditor's factual allegations. However, the court went on to
address the debtor's argument that the transfer of the house was not a
"transfer" within the meaning of § 727(a) of the Code.
The creditor based its argument on the Fifth Circuit's 1983 opinion in
Reed, which held that "a debtor who converts nonexempt assets to an
exempt homestead immediately before bankruptcy, with intent to de-
fraud his creditors, must be denied a discharge. ' 75 Judge Rhoades distin-
guished this case because in Reed, the debtor actually disposed of and
sold the asset, placing the proceeds into his homestead. The debtor here
simply moved into a home he already owned, and did not dispose of, sell,
or "transfer" anything. The creditor argued, however, that a homestead
was a property right that could be transferred. The court disagreed as a
matter of law, basing its holding on the recent Fifth Circuit opinion in
Rogers, which concluded that in the context of § 522 of the Code, a home-
74. TSCA-234 Ltd. P'ship v. Moseman (In re Moseman), 436 B.R. 398 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 2010).




stead right was not an "interest" the debtor acquired when she moved
into her home. Construing and applying Rogers, the court held as
follows:
The Fifth Circuit held in Rogers that a 'homestead interest' is not
the sort of vested economic interest that can be acquired by a debtor.
One has 'interests' in the property itself, not in the exemption that
protects those interests. The homestead interest simply gives protec-
tive legal security to those vested economic interests in property that
were acquired by the debtor before the filing of the petition. Like-
wise, in the bankruptcy context, the homestead exemption and the
property interest impressed with that exemption are discrete con-
cepts: the former is the debtor's legal right to exempt certain prop-
erty interests from the bankruptcy estate, the latter is the debtor's
vested economic interests in the property itself.76
Accordingly, because the homestead was not an "interest" under the
Code, the debtor had not transferred a debtor interest prior to the peti-
tion date as required by § 727(a) of the Code.
While the Moseman opinion may be a natural consequence of the Fifth
Circuit's Rogers opinion, it remains to be seen whether Moseman will
have an impact on pre-bankruptcy planning. Because no underlying asset
was disposed of to a third party, Moseman may have little real world ap-
plication. On the other hand, Moseman stands for the proposition that an
exemption is not an "interest" for purposes of § 727(a) of the Code. Be-
cause a debtor may have an exemption in many types of assets other than
just a homestead and these exemptions may vary based on applicable
state law, whether federal law applies, and one's marital status, the hold-
ing of Moseman may be used to support pre-bankruptcy planning and the
placing of non-exempt assets into exempt ones.
VII. CLASS ACTIONS
A. IN RE WILBORN
7 7
In Wilborn, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a bankruptcy court
has authority to certify a class for class action purposes. The debtor
sought to certify a class consisting of individuals who had filed Chapter 13
petitions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas
in order to sue a bank for allegedly charging undisclosed fees postpeti-
tion. The bankruptcy court certified the class and the Fifth Circuit per-
mitted a direct, interlocutory appeal.
The issue before the Fifth Circuit was the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion. Given that each class member was a debtor under Chapter 13, there
was no question that bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 ex-
isted. The precise question was whether a bankruptcy court could certify
a class when members of that class filed petitions before different bank-
76. Moseman, 436 B.R. at 408 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
77. Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2010).
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ruptcy courts, albeit in the same district. While the court recognized that
reported opinions disagreed on this issue and multiple other courts had
concluded that a bankruptcy court may not certify a class of debtors, it
disagreed with the bankruptcy court and held that a bankruptcy court
does have the power to certify a class of debtors. The circuit court rooted
its holding in the fact that Congress provided as much in Bankruptcy
Rule 7023:
Although a federal rule may not extend a court's jurisdiction, its
intended purpose should be upheld so long as it otherwise offends no
substantive rights. We see no such result here. On the contrary, if
bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of
debtors, Rule 7023 is virtually read out of the rules. 78
Although the court held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to
certify a class of debtors, it reversed its certification in this case because
the elements for class certification were not met.
While limited in its practical application, given both the limited in-
stances of bankruptcy class actions and the requirements of Rule 23, this
opinion recognizes the breadth of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and of
such court's ability to exercise the powers referred to it by the district
court. It is important to note, however, that the issue was whether a
bankruptcy court could certify a class where the underlying cause of ac-
tion concerned rights under the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy
Rules-the Fifth Circuit's opinion should not be read so broadly as to
suggest a bankruptcy court may certify a class involving non-debtors or
non-bankruptcy rights.
VIII. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
A. REED V. CITY OF ARLINGTON7 9
This is one of the most important Fifth Circuit bankruptcy opinions
dealing with judicial estoppel because the court judicially estopped the
Chapter 7 trustee rather than the debtor for his failure to schedule a valu-
able cause of action.80
The debtor in this case, a former firefighter in Arlington, Texas, filed
suit against the City of Arlington (the "City") for violation of the Family
Medical Leave Act and obtained a district court judgment in excess of $1
million. After the City appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit, the
debtor and his wife filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case but failed to in-
clude the pending judgment in their bankruptcy schedules and state-
ments. The debtor also failed to disclose other non-exempt property
interests and assets and the "no-asset" bankruptcy case was closed by the
trustee with the debtor having secured a discharge.
78. Id. at 754 (internal citations omitted).
79. Reed v. City of Arlington, 620 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2010).
80. Id. at 479.
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After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment, settlement
discussions ensued and the debtor disclosed the prior bankruptcy to his
attorney for the first time. The trustee was notified and the Chapter 7
case was reopened. The trustee obtained an order from the district court
substituting herself for the debtor in the litigation even though the district
court was divested of jurisdiction by the appeal. The City filed a supple-
ment to its petition for rehearing with the Fifth Circuit seeking a take-
nothing judgment against the debtor on the theory the debtor was judi-
cially estopped from collecting due to his failure to schedule the judgment
in his bankruptcy case. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for a ruling on the judicial estoppel claim. While the district court
found the debtor was judicially estopped from collecting the judgment,
the district court found the trustee was not similarly estopped.
Chief Judge Edith Jones began her analysis by noting that "[jiudicial
estoppel is a doctrine that protects the integrity of court proceedings by
preventing a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is
inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding. '81
The court next noted that although the trustee had not taken inconsistent
positions in the litigation (as is required for judicial estoppel), "she suc-
ceeds to the debtor's claim with all its attributes, including the potential
for judicial estoppel. ' 82 In effect, the court concluded the trustee had
stepped into the debtor's shoes. The Fifth Circuit felt that creditors were
not disadvantaged by the judicial estoppel because few creditors filed
claims and there were administrative claims to be paid first (a seemingly
unsupported and illogical argument because administrative creditors are
creditors), and it believed even the defendant, i.e. the City, may have
been victimized by the failure to disclose the claim (apparently without
evidence supporting this belief). Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted the
debtor obtained a discharge and was able to get "rid of his creditors. '83
Apparently, permitting the trustee to recover would reward this behavior,
although the Fifth Circuit, like the district court, could have simply ap-
plied judicial estoppel to any debtor recovery under § 726 of the Code.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit applied judicial estoppel to both the trustee and
the debtor-something that appears unprecedented. Among other
things, if the trustee did nothing wrong, the court could have limited judi-
cial estoppel to ensure that the wrongdoer, i.e. the debtor, would not ben-
efit; but the court speculated that creditors would not be harmed, even
though facially the facts seem otherwise. The court's analysis also failed
to take into account its prior opinion in Grotjohn where it concluded that
a debtor had no ability to divest the Chapter 7 estate of intangible per-
sonal property.84 Therefore, Reed may represent a dangerous extension
81. Id. at 481 (internal quotation omitted).
82. Id. at 482.
83. Id. at 483.
84. Reed v. Rabe (In re Grotjohn), 289 Fed. Appx. 702 (5th Cir. 2008). In an ironic
twist, the Grotjohn Chapter 7 case (at the lower court level) concerned the same trustee
successfully seeking to judicially estop the debtor from exempting a lawsuit he failed to
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of judicial estoppel as an offensive weapon that enables a wrongdoer, in
this case the City, to escape liability while harming innocent creditors
even though a trustee or other fiduciary did nothing wrong. On the other
hand, judicial estoppel exists to protect the integrity of the courts and
here the debtor manipulated the courts on multiple fronts. As a doctrine
to punish wrongdoing does not exist, perhaps the innocence or guilt of
the trustee should not matter. Yet, bankruptcy courts, being courts of
equity appear to have ample safeguards to ensure their vindication and to
prevent benefitting a wrongdoer, without prejudicing innocent creditors
or rewarding the other wrongdoer (for example, judicial estoppel and a
host of Title 18 violations can be applied solely against the debtor).
On February 22, 2011, the circuit granted en banc review of Reed with
arguments scheduled for May 2011. The authors encourage any reader of
this Survey to research the results of this review, although a summary of
that review will certainly appear in next year's Survey.
B. IN RE GOOD85
Good concerned a Chapter 11 debtor who objected to a secured credi-
tor's claim after the confirmation of the plan, arguing the collateral value
was less than the stated amount of the secured claim. Although the pro-
cedural background is complicated, the confirmed plan allowed the se-
cured creditor's claim, but the debtor repeatedly represented that the
secured creditor was oversecured. Thus the court entered an order pro-
viding for the contract rate of interest to be paid to the secured creditor
under the plan because the creditor was oversecured. After the effective-
ness of the plan, the debtor objected to the secured claim arguing that the
collateral value was approximately half the amount of the claim. The
creditor sought summary judgment, arguing the plan and the confirma-
tion order constituted res judicata, and the debtor was judicially estopped
from seeking to value the secured claim at less than the full claim
amount.
Chief Judge Rhoades of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Texas agreed with the creditor and denied the claim objection.
First, the court held the confirmation date, and not the plan effective
date, is the appropriate date for valuing the claim. This is due to a court's
need to know the value at the time for confirmation purposes, and a con-
tractual plan effective date may happen much later than confirmation of
the plan or expiration of the appeal period. Next, the court held that it
necessarily valued the claim as part of the confirmation process, along
with entry of the confirmation order and subsequent orders on the plan.
Finally, applying judicial estoppel, the court found that:
LCI's arguments in support of its present objection directly contra-
dict the arguments and evidence presented at confirmation. The
schedule. In Reed, the same doctrine and logic was used to estop the trustee, even though
she did nothing wrong.
85. In re Good, 428 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010).
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Court relied on RMR's oversecured status as of the statutory effec-
tive date in confirming LCI's plan. LCI's plan would not have been
feasible if the 'effective date' upon which RMR's claim was to be
valued was some indeterminate date in the future.8 6
Moreover, the court noted that if the creditor was undersecured, it
would have had a deficiency claim entitling it to vote on the plan.8 7 This
would enable the creditor to veto the unsecured class, and the debtor
would have to comply with the cramdown requirements to obtain confir-
mation. Accordingly, there was a representation accepted by the court,
and the debtor changed its position to the detriment of the creditor. The
court therefore judicially estopped the debtor from challenging the value
of the secured claim.88
IX. JURISDICTION
A. IN RE CONDOR INSURANCE LTD. 8 9
Condor Insurance Ltd. was previously discussed at length for its impor-
tance to avoidance actions. It is also included in this Section because of
its holding that a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction under foreign law to
consider avoidance actions brought by a foreign representative in a Chap-
ter 15 proceeding. The Fifth Circuit noted in the process that Chapter 15
specifically directs courts to "'consider its international origin, and the
need to promote an application of the chapter that is consistent with the
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions' in inter-
preting its provisions." 90 Chapter 15 was adopted in part to ensure for-
eign countries also adopting the Model Law provided judicial assistance
to U.S. proceedings. Although Chapter 15 provides that a foreign repre-
sentative may not resort to the Bankruptcy Code's avoidance action pro-
visions, the circuit read the jurisdictional bases of Chapter 15 broadly
along with its important purposes for international insolvency cases, and
concluded the exception to jurisdiction should be read narrowly. Thus,
by specifically excluding avoidance claims under the Bankruptcy Code
but not specifically excluding similar claims arising under foreign law, the
circuit held Congress did not intend to limit the bankruptcy court's juris-
diction and prohibited consideration of avoidance actions under foreign
law.
B. IN RE WILBORN9 1
As discussed in Section VII.A, the Fifth Circuit in Wilborn held that a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to certify a class action, at least when
86. Id. at 246.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 247.
89. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir.
2010).
90. Id. at 321 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006)).
91. Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2010).
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the underlying causes of action involve bankruptcy rights and statutes
over which the bankruptcy court exercises core jurisdiction. 92 Further-
more, the court held the bankruptcy court may certify a class even though
the members of that class filed bankruptcy petitions before different
bankruptcy courts.93 The Fifth Circuit rooted its holding in the language
found in Bankruptcy Rule 7023:
Although a federal rule may not extend a court's jurisdiction, its
intended purpose should be upheld so long as it otherwise offends no
substantive rights. We see no such result here. On the contrary, if
bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of
debtors, Rule 7023 is virtually read out of the rules.94
X. PROFESSIONALS
A. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MLAVETZ, P.A. v. UNITED STATES9 5
In this opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court put to rest the issue of whether
attorneys are "debt relief agencies" under the 2005 Code amendments
and whether such a rule is constitutional. The Court held that attorneys
are debt relief agencies within the statute and the statute applied as such
is constitutional. 96
A debt relief agency is defined as "any person who provides any bank-
ruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of
money or other valuable consideration. '97 As explained by the Court:
"By definition, 'bankruptcy assistance' includes several services com-
monly performed by attorneys. Indeed, some forms of bankruptcy assis-
tance, including the 'provi[sion of] legal representation with respect to a
case or proceeding,' may be provided only by attorneys." 98 The Court
therefore easily concluded that attorneys fall within the definition, re-
jecting arguments to the contrary. 99 Next, the Court considered whether
the statute was constitutional as applied to attorneys. This issue came
down to whether the statute was read broadly or narrowly-in prohibit-
ing an attorney from advising a debtor "to incur more debt 'in contempla-
tion of' filing for bankruptcy," what is the proper scope of the phrase
"contemplation of bankruptcy?"' 00 The attorney, reading the statute
broadly, argued this provision prohibits any advice to incur debt when
one is thinking he might have to file bankruptcy. The Court disagreed,
noting that "in contemplation of bankruptcy" is a term of art.10 1 Review-
ing the common definition, the location of the term in the Code, the spec-
92. Id. at 754
93. Id. at 753.
94. Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
95. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
96. Id. at 1329.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2006).
98. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1332 (citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1334.
101. Id. at 1335-36.
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ified remedies, and congressional intent, the Court concluded that the
phrase properly means "the thought of declaring bankruptcy because of
the inability to continue current financial operations, often coupled with
action designed to thwart the distribution of assets in a bankruptcy
proceeding."'10 2
Thus, the phrase "in contemplation of bankruptcy" as used in the stat-
ute already necessarily includes a negative motive or purpose to the effect
it inappropriately removes assets from creditors or inappropriately hin-
ders creditor recovery. As interpreted by the Court, "the phrase refers to
a specific type of misconduct designed to manipulate the protections of
the bankruptcy system.' 10 3 Because the challenge to the statute was
based on constitutional vagueness and the Court had reversed the lower
courts, the Court did not proceed to consider the First Amendment chal-
lenge. However, the Court considered the First Amendment issue with
respect to Code § 528's disclosure requirements holding there was no
constitutional issue because the "challenged provisions impose a disclo-
sure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on speech." 10 4
Therefore, this opinion has put to rest the issue of § 528 disclosure re-
quirements as well as confirming that attorneys can be debt relief agen-
cies under the Code. The opinion also provides important guidance as to
the meaning of "in contemplation of bankruptcy" by reading into the
phrase an abusive or improper motive. This interpretation will likely
have a broader impact than just this opinion, given this phrase's use in the
law generally and in the Code specifically. And while the prohibition on
advising a client to incur new debt survived this constitutional challenge,
the opinion provides guidance that discussing the potential incurrence of
new debt for bona fide purposes free of abusive motive may not be pro-
hibited by the statute. The opinion also leaves open a potential First
Amendment challenge to the statute; although, as the phrase has now
been interpreted, the challenge seems unlikely to succeed because the
prohibition is limited to advising a client to engage in abusive and poten-
tially illegal conduct.
B. IN RE TALSMA 10 5
In Talsma, Judge D. Michal Lynn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas considered whether a Chapter 11 debtor-in-
possession could retain a professional (in this case an accounting firm)
with a prepetition claim against the debtor. The debtor, a dairy farm,
sought to retain an accounting firm the court described as one of only a
few accounting firms located in the debtor's rural area specializing in the
debtor's dairy business. The U.S. trustee objected, arguing the account-
ant was not disinterested for purposes of retention under § 327 of the
102. Id. at 1334 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (8th ed. 2004)).
103. Id. at 1336.
104. Id. at 1339, 1341.
105. In re Talsma, 436 B.R. 908 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
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Code unless the accountant waived its claim of approximately $11,700
(which qualified them as one of the debtor's twenty largest unsecured
creditors).
The bankruptcy court therefore confronted the interplay between
Code § 327 and § 1107, the latter of which provides: "Notwithstanding
section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment
under section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely because of
such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before the
commencement of the case."' 10 6 The court began its analysis by conclud-
ing that as a prepetition creditor, the accountant was not disinterested
and therefore could not be retained under § 327(a) of the Code.10 7 The
court noted that most opinions conclude that § 1107 does not permit em-
ployment of a prepetition professional if the professional holds a claim
against the estate; the section merely provides that prior employment is
not a disqualification, and prior employment and a claim are two separate
matters. A minority of opinions, on the other hand, conclude that prior
employment with a prepetition claim on account of such prior employ-
ment necessarily contemplates a potential claim against the estate, and
because § 1107 excepts prior employment as a disqualification, it necessa-
rily also excepts a prepetition claim as a disqualification.
Reviewing the language of § 1107, the court stated the majority gives
undue weight to the word "solely" in the statute and insufficient weight
to the opening clause, "notwithstanding § 327(a)." 10 8 The court applied
the cannon of statutory interpretation that each statutory provision must
have a purpose, noting that nothing in § 327(a) disqualifies a professional
from being employed merely on account of prepetition employment and
construing § 1107(b) to provide an exception for something that does not
exist leaves the statute without a purpose (i.e., if prior employment is not
a disqualification to begin with, then providing an exception merely from
disqualification for prior employment is unnecessary or nonsensical). 10 9
"Therefore, for the words '[n]otwithstanding section 327(a) of this title' to
have any effect, section 1107(b) must do more than exempt professionals
from disqualification based on just the fact of prepetition employment by
the debtor." 110 The court found further support for the minority view in
the Bankruptcy Act which does not require disinterestedness under
Chapter XI of the Act, but requires it for a trustee and his profession-
als."1 The court further noted that sound policy favored the minority
view: a debtor-in-possession is like any person and should be able to
choose its own professionals, and adopting the majority view might en-
courage a debtor to pay its professionals on the eve of bankruptcy, which
would not conserve cash and may lead to avoidance litigation.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (2006).
107. Talsma, 436 B.R. at 911.
108. Id. at 913.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 913-14.
111. Id. at 916.
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Accordingly, the court adopted the minority view and held the debtor
could retain the accountant even though the accountant held a prepeti-
tion claim and the accountant did not waive such claim.11 2 The court cau-
tioned, however, that § 107(b) was not carte blanche authority; while it
excused the fact of employment and the resulting claim from § 327(a),
there are other circumstances that may lead to disqualification under
§ 327(a) such as a professional-creditor serving on a committee or being
able to control a class under the plan.
This is an interesting opinion that represents an apparent change in
prior Northern District of Texas law. On one hand, it will facilitate em-
ployment of prepetition professionals and should therefore aid with a re-
organization in the earlier stages of a Chapter 11 case. On the other
hand, it remains to be seen whether this opinion will affect boutique reor-
ganization firms and what the overall effect may be. It will also be inter-
esting to see if professionals voting their claims under a plan are affected,
and whether such non-insider votes can be challenged-albeit that a pro-
fessional will vote his claim against a plan submitted by his client is
unlikely.
XI. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. IN RE TEXAS WYOMING DRILLING, INC. 1 13
Discussed above in Section IV at length is Judge Lynn's opinion in
Texas Wyoming Drilling, Inc. as it relates to postconfirmation prosecu-
tion of causes of action. However, the opinion addresses a second issue
of significant importance, even if not frequently applied. Namely, does
the trustee have standing to prosecute preconfirmation causes of action in
light of the postconfirmation conversion of the case to Chapter 7 even if
the reorganized debtor would not have such standing? The court con-
cluded the trustee does have such standing.'1 4 In the process, the court
provides significant guidance on the application of § 348 of the Code.
The court began by noting that the avoidance actions the trustee sought
to prosecute were property of the estate as of the petition date and at all
times postconfirmation. United Operating concluded that a postconfirma-
tion debtor lacked standing to prosecute the causes of action; however,
United Operating did not conclude that the causes of action themselves
had been extinguished. 1 5 Because the issue is one of standing, it may be
that one person lacks standing to prosecute a claim while another person
has such standing as long as the cause of action still exists. Therefore, just
because a postconfirmation debtor (or other entity) may lack standing
does not by itself lead to the conclusion that a trustee would also lack
112. Id.
113. Spicer v. Laguna Madre Oil & Gas II, L.L.C. (In re Tex. Wyo. Drilling, Inc.), 422
B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
114. Id. at 637-38.
115. Id. at 626.
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such standing under the defendants' argument that the trustee does noth-
ing more than step into the shoes of the postconfirmation debtor.
The court analyzed § 348 as the applicable statutory provision. Under
§ 348 of the Code, the effects of conversion are governed by two dates-
the date of conversion and date of the commencement of the case. Un-
less a particular Code section listed in § 348 is being changed by conver-
sion, that conversion does not change the date of the case's
commencement. Section 541 defines estate property as property of the
estate on the date of commencement. Because § 348 does not list § 541
as triggered by the conversion date, the date of commencement of the
case is not affected or changed by the conversion. Thus, the original peti-
tion date remains the date of commencement under § 541 of the Code
notwithstanding the conversion. The court noted that other courts are
split on the question of whether property "revests" in the estate postcon-
firmation.116 However, because the Code provides for either the remedy
of dismissal or conversion in the event of a default under a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan, the potential of a conversion must have meaning and
there must be a Chapter 7 estate to administer. Otherwise, what would
be the point of a conversion and who would own the property remaining
postconfirmation? Accordingly, "property that has not been disposed of
by the debtor is reinstated as property of the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate
upon conversion.' 17
Therefore, because conversion is specifically provided for in the event
of a plan default and conversion does not change the commencement
date of a case and because § 541 speaks in terms of estate property as of
the commencement of a case, the property of the converted estate con-
sists of the estate property on the petition date, except the property the
debtor disposed of since that date. 18 Thus, even if the postconfirmation
debtor lacked standing because the claims had not been disposed of by
judgment and were not extinguished, they revested in the estate and the
trustee has authority to administer assets of the estate under the Code.119
This conclusion has applications past its holding. First, the court con-
cluded that postconfirmation property revests in the converted estate.1 20
While postconfirmation conversions are rare (as opposed to dismissals),
this opinion addresses perhaps the most fundamental question raised by
this scenario: what property does the converted estate consist of? Sec-
ond, this opinion concludes that a cause of action that may be challenged
for a lack of standing under United Operating, is not itself disposed of or
extinguished.1 2' Finally, this opinion confirms that even if one person
lacks standing over a cause of action, another person may have such
standing (also confirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana World Exposi-
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 633-34.




tion).122 This opinion may even provide a potential mechanism for resur-
recting valuable and important causes of action otherwise lost under a
confirmed plan.
As noted above, this opinion is on direct appeal to the Fifth Circuit and
practitioners are encouraged to research the results, which will almost
certainly be addressed in next year's Survey.
B. IN RE MOORE 12 3
The Moore case considered two matters of first impression: (1) is a
cause of action belonging to an estate an asset the trustee can sell and (2)
does a trustee's proposed settlement of an estate's cause of action impli-
cate the Code's sale provisions and principles such that if a creditor of-
fered to buy the claims for more than the settlement amount, normal sale
and auction procedures should have been followed. The Fifth Circuit an-
swered both questions in the affirmative. 124
Prior to the petition date, a creditor sued the debtor and various other
persons and entities affiliated with the debtor. The creditor based its
claims against the third parties on reverse veil piercing and fraudulent
transfer. Once the debtor filed his Chapter 7 petition, the trustee suc-
ceeded to the fraudulent transfer and alter ego claims under prior Fifth
Circuit precedent, and the creditor funded the trustee's continued litiga-
tion. The trustee eventually proposed a litigation settlement to the estate
in the amount of $37,500-much less than the funds the creditor had ad-
vanced towards the litigation. The creditor therefore objected to the sale
and offered the trustee $50,000 to buy the claims. The trustee, while not-
ing that the creditor's offer was better, proceeded with the settlement.
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement, concluding as a matter of
law that the causes of action could not be sold and based its ruling on that
conclusion. 125
The court quickly concluded that the trustee may generally sell causes
of action as property of the estate under § 363 of the Code similar to any
other asset: "A trustee may sell litigation claims that belong to the estate,
as it can other estate property, pursuant to § 363(b)." 126 With respect to
the specific causes of action here, the Fifth Circuit reviewed its precedent,
such as In re S.I. Acquisitions127 and In re Mortgage America Corp.,128
and noted a trustee may augment property of the estate through avoid-
ance actions including those assertable by creditors under § 544. Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that both the alter ego cause of action and the
122. Id. at 637-38.
123. The Cadle Co. v. Mims (In re Moore), 608 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
124. Id. at 266.
125. Id. at 257.
126. Id. at 257-58.
127. See generally S.. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv. (In re S.I Acquisi-
tion), 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987).
128. See generally Am. Nat'l Bank v. Mortgage Am. Corp. (In re Mortgage Am. Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
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fraudulent transfer cause of action were property of the estate. 12 9 The
Fifth Circuit confirmed its precedent in this respect, which has been ques-
tionable. The court also rejected certain cases which found a trustee may
not sell causes of action that the trustee has authority over pursuant to
Code § 544. Thus, because the causes of action were estate property,
they could be sold by the trustee under § 363 of the Code.' 30
Next, addressing the interplay between a settlement and sale, the court
noted that "[w]hether a trustee's proposed compromise of estate claims
can constitute a proposed sale of estate property that triggers § 363 sale
provisions is an issue of first impression in this circuit.' 13 1 It reviewed the
various standards applicable to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and § 363(b) sales
noting that "[a] trustee has the duty to maximize the value of the es-
tate."'1 32 The court also noted a split between other circuits when faced
with this issue on whether the associated rule(s) of Rule 9019 or § 363(b)
control. Ultimately, the court agreed with opinions applying the sale
standards of § 363(b) to a proposed settlement: "The proposed compro-
mise was a disposition of estate property. Cadle's higher offer obligated
the bankruptcy court to consider whether an auction and § 363 sale were
appropriate .... Whether to impose formal sale procedures is ultimately
a matter of discretion' that we leave to bankruptcy courts."'1 33
Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted one or both provisions may apply de-
pending on the mechanism pursued by the trustee:
In the event an auction is held and the trustee selects defendants'
offer, the bankruptcy court must assess the transaction as both a pro-
posed sale under § 363 and a proposed compromise under rule 9019.
Procedures under that rule would not be invoked, however, were the
trustee to accept Cadle's bid, because the transaction would not con-
stitute a proposed settlement. 34
What is not answered is whether, in the absence of a party interested in
purchasing the causes of action, the bankruptcy court must assess the set-
tlement as both a proposed sale and a proposed compromise. Or is the
settlement just a proposed compromise under Rule 9019? Of course, in
the absence of someone interested in purchasing the cause of action, the
end result and factors employed by the bankruptcy court may be the
same.
129. In re Moore, 608 F.3d at 258-59, 262.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 263.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 265 (quoting Goodwin v. Mickey Thompson Entm't Group, Inc., 292 B.R.
415, 422 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003)).




A. IN RE KIZZEE-JORDAN 13 5
In Kizzee-Jordan, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the appropriate Chapter
13 plan interest rate for an ad valorem real property tax claim sold to Tax
Ease Funding. As practitioners may be aware, Texas law was changed
several years ago to provide for a third-party payment of one's real prop-
erty taxes and an assignment of the tax claim with resulting lien rights to
such third party to secure the land owner's repayment to the same (usu-
ally at a higher interest rate than the one provided to the taxing authori-
ties for the tax claim). The question was whether the assignment of Tax
Ease Funding's claim was a tax claim within the meaning of § 511 of the
Code such that it could not be modified under the debtor's Chapter 13
and Chapter 11 plan. Here, the plan provided for a 5% interest rate on
the claim. The bankruptcy court, holding the tax claim was extinguished
when paid by Tax Ease, found the plan could modify the debtor's "new"
note obligation to Tax Ease.136 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.' 37
The Fifth Circuit analyzed § 511 of the Code and confirmed that "[ilt is
now clear that when a federal, state, or local governmental entity pursues
a claim against a bankrupt for unpaid taxes, the applicable interest rate is
determined in accord with nonbankruptcy law."1 38 However, the statute
is not entirely clear whether a "tax claim" as used in the statute remains a
"tax claim" when held by a third party who pays the underlying taxes.
Construing the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[i]n the
simplest terms, a tax claim is a broad right to payment of taxes."'1 39 The
court next noted that § 511 of the Code applies to "creditors." Because
the Code separately defines and employs the phrase "governmental
unit," the court decided that had Congress intended to limit § 511 only to
a tax claim held by a governmental unit, Congress could have easily em-
ployed the term "governmental unit" instead of the broader term "credi-
tor" in § 511. Analyzing Texas law, the court further held that Texas
statutes entitled Tax Ease to exercise any and all rights and remedies of
the transferring tax unit.140 Finally, analyzing the argument that the pay-
ment by Tax Ease extinguished the underlying tax lien, the Fifth Circuit
held as follows:
If the tax claim against the property owner were extinguished, the
tax collector would issue the tax receipt to that property owner, not
the transferee. By allowing a transferee to pay the taxes and receive
the tax receipt and lien, the statutory scheme changes only the entity
to which the Thompsons are indebted for the taxes originally owed,
135. Tax Ease Funding L.P. v. Thompson (In re Kizzee-Jordan), 626 F.3d 239 (5th Cir.
2010).
136. Id. at 241.
137. Id. at 244.
138. Id. at 242-43.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 244.
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not the nature of the underlying debt upon which the claim is based.
We do not think the tax lien otherwise could be properly transferred
if the tax debt was extinguished. 141
Even though Tax Ease had different rights than the taxing authorities
(namely that it could charge considerably higher interest) the court con-
cluded the underlying claim was still a tax claim within the meaning of
§ 511 of the Code such that the interest could not be modified under a
plan.142
Interestingly, the court did not consider other potential claim modifica-
tions except the applicable interest. For example, under §§ 1129(a)(9)(C)
and (D) of the Code, a Chapter 11 plan may repay a secured tax claim
over five years. However, these sections reference back to § 507(a)(8)
which specifically applies to claims by a "governmental unit." One basis
of the court's opinion is that § 511 employs the term "creditor" instead of
a "governmental unit." Given that logic, it appears that § 507(a)(8) and
§ 1129(a)(9) of the Code would not apply to a tax claim assigned to a
third party lender. If so, then the claim may be treated under the plan
rather than through periodic cash payments within five years of the peti-
tion date, so long as the interest rate is not modified. For example, the
claim could accrue postpetition and postconfirmation interest, but be re-
paid through a balloon payment at some point in the future upon a sale,
which may be more than five years after the petition date. Whether this
logical result of the Fifth Circuit's analysis is correct remains to be seen.
XIII. TRUSTEE LIABILITY
A. IN RE TEXAS PIG STANDS, INC.14 3
In Texas Pig Stands, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered whether a Chap-
ter 11 trustee was personally liable for postpetition sales taxes. The trus-
tee, apparently because of cash flow problems and a desire to get the
debtors to confirm the plan, failed to pay postpetition sales taxes on a
plan of reorganization where the debtors' restaurants would be sold. The
bankruptcy court held the trustee was not personally liable absent gross
negligence.1 44 The issue involved the language of the confirmed plan and
implementation of the trust agreement, which the bankruptcy court be-
lieved absolved the trustee from liability absent gross negligence.
The trustee proceeded pro se before the circuit arguing that "the mere
'deferral' of tax payments was implicitly or explicitly authorized under
bankruptcy law, which allegedly supersedes state tax law in this re-
spect.1 45 The Fifth Circuit disagreed.1 46 Noting Texas law imposes per-
141. Id. at 244-45.
142. Id. at 246.
143. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Liuzza (In re Tex. Pig Stands, Inc.), 610 F.3d
937 (5th Cir. 2010).
144. Id. at 940.
145. Id. at 942.
146. Id. at 945.
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sonal liability on a controlling person for nonpayment of taxes, here the
trustee knew that the taxes were due and he used the money to pay other
creditors. Thus, the trustee's failure to pay the taxes was willful under
prior precedent construing the tax statutes. With respect to the argument
that the trustee had a duty to maximize the value for the estate and that
his good intentions absolved him of liability, the circuit noted that
"[g]ood intentions are irrelevant" when it comes to payment of these
taxes.147 The circuit held that the trustee mistakenly relied on prior pre-
cedent concerning a trustee's potential liability: "That a trustee is only
liable to the estate for acts of gross negligence, has nothing to do with a
statutory duty to the state to pay taxes held in trust. '148 Moreover, 28
U.S.C. § 959 and § 960 require that a business be operated in conformity
with nonbankruptcy law, and specifically require the timely payment of
state taxes. Finally, the circuit noted that the funds in question were trust
funds collected by the debtors and although they became property of the
estate, § 541(d) of the Code limited what the trustee could do with these
funds and the trustee was not free to dispose of them.149
The message is clear: Beware if you are a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
trustee operating a business. You must ensure that postpetition trust
funds and other taxes are timely paid; do not rely on a debtor to do it for
you (especially in a case like Texas Pig Stands where the debtor had seri-
ous cash flow problems). You may face personal liability if you collect
trust fund taxes and fail to pay them to the appropriate authority. More-
over, do not rely on customary quasi-judicial immunity, plan language, or
language in a trust agreement to absolve you. If you rely on a plan docu-
ment, ensure that the plan and the confirmation order clearly contain
provisions absolving you of liability or enjoining any personal actions
against you. However, the bankruptcy court may not be permitted to
issue such protections if objected to by the taxing authorities because
they would effectively constitute a nonconsensual third party release.
XIV. CONCLUSION
By the time this article is published or shortly thereafter, several im-
portant opinions will have been issued-the Supreme Court will have de-
cided the bounds of bankruptcy court claims adjudication in the Stern v.
Marsha1 50 matter, the Fifth Circuit will have decided the judicial estop-
pel issue en banc as well as refined the issue of claim retention under a
plan. These opinions will be discussed in next year's Survey and the prac-
titioner will very likely be familiar with them. At the same time, this
article discusses various other important opinions, and the practitioner is
encouraged to familiarize himself with these opinions and to follow their
progress through the appellate courts if applicable. The authors hope this
147. Id.
148. Id. at 943 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 945.
150. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
[Vol. 64
2011] Bankruptcy 85
article, together with their thoughts on the cases addressed herein, pro-
vides the practitioner with guidance and potential ideas that will help en-
able the bankruptcy bar to continue providing excellent service to its
clients, the courts, and the bankruptcy system which we all serve.
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